Vote buying remains one of the most persistent threats to democratic consolidation and electoral integrity in Nigeria, particularly in states characterized by socio-economic vulnerability and institutional fragility. This study examined vote buying and electoral integrity among registered voters in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, Nigeria, with the aim of analyzing the socio-economic determinants of vote buying among registered voters, evaluating the effectiveness of existing electoral safeguards in mitigating transactional voting, and proposing a policy framework for strengthening electoral integrity in the region. Specifically, the study addressed three research questions: the extent to which localized poverty influences voters' susceptibility to financial inducements; how institutional and security lapses facilitate the operational success of vote buying; and the behavioural shifts required to decouple economic necessity from electoral participation. A comparative cross-sectional survey research design was adopted to obtain empirical evidence from registered voters across selected local government areas in both states. Data were collected using a structured questionnaire administered through a multistage sampling procedure. Descriptive statistics comprising mean and standard deviation were employed to summarize respondents' perceptions, while the Chi-square (χ²) test of independence was used to examine significant associations between socio-economic conditions, institutional factors, voter behaviour, and electoral integrity at the 0.05 level of significance. The findings revealed significant inter-state similarities and variations in the dynamics of vote buying. In both Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, localized poverty, unemployment, and declining household income significantly increased voters' susceptibility to financial inducement. However, the prevalence of vote buying was comparatively higher in Akwa Ibom State, where greater financial resources available to political actors enabled more extensive distribution of cash and material incentives during election periods. Conversely, respondents in Cross River State reported relatively stronger influence of community networks, party loyalty, and interpersonal relationships in facilitating electoral inducements. The study further established that institutional weaknesses, including inconsistent enforcement of electoral laws, inadequate prosecution of electoral offenders, and lapses in election security, significantly undermined the effectiveness of existing electoral safeguards in both states despite the introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS). The study concludes that technological innovations alone cannot eliminate transactional politics without complementary socio-economic and institutional reforms. The study recommends the implementation of comprehensive poverty-reduction and social protection programmes targeted at economically vulnerable communities; the establishment of an independent Electoral Offences Commission with enhanced investigative and prosecutorial powers supported by technology-driven election surveillance systems; and sustained civic and voter education programmes involving electoral institutions, civil society organizations, educational institutions, religious bodies, and traditional leaders to strengthen democratic values, discourage transactional voting, and promote long-term electoral integrity in Nigeria.