When the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 replaced India’s old 10+2 schooling structure with a 5+3+3+4 model, it did something Indian education policy had not really done before: it brought three- to six-year-olds formally into the school system, as part of a new “Foundational Stage.” In practice, this means Anganwadi centres — institutions built and staffed for decades around nutrition and basic health, not classroom teaching — are now expected to also deliver structured, play-based early education. This paper asks what published research says about the structural readiness of that system, rather than what the policy documents hope for. Because almost all of the available facility audits and service-delivery studies on Anganwadi centres were carried out before NEP 2020 or right at its announcement, the review treats them explicitly as baseline evidence of the conditions NEP 2020 inherited, not as evidence of the policy’s own performance. Read this way, three things stand out repeatedly: Anganwadi centres were often physically unprepared for play-based learning, the training given to Anganwadi workers was short and may not have been enough to shift long-standing teaching habits, and preschool education consistently came out as the weakest part of what these centres delivered — well behind nutrition. Studies from Gujarat, Karnataka, Delhi, Uttarakhand, Manipur, and Jammu and Kashmir all point to the same kinds of gaps: not enough indoor space, poor sanitation, missing teaching materials. Against this baseline, the review also brings in what limited post-2020 evidence exists — national training rollouts under Poshan Bhi Padhai Bhi, the state-level expansion of Balvatika classes, and a 2024 field study from Uttarakhand — to ask whether implementation is beginning to close these gaps. The picture that emerges is of a policy with a genuinely good vision, built on top of decades of underinvestment that has only begun to be addressed, largely through workforce training rather than infrastructure. The paper ends by pointing out where the evidence itself still runs thin — particularly the continued absence of any post-2020 facility audit in several states, including Jammu and Kashmir — and argues that this is exactly where research needs to go next if anyone wants to know whether NEP 2020 is actually changing things on the ground.