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I Feel Like I Am Unable to Talk-Is Phenomenal Concept Effeable?

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ABSTRACT:

This paper is developed to shed light on the old perspective that language is never enough to grasp the feeling, and no matter how much we express, there is always something ineffable about it. A concept is an umbrella term that can be described in a number of ways. In section 1, I discussed different notions of concepts. Section 2 will address the ineffability of the phenomenal mental states, specifically focusing on Wittgenstein's (1953/2009) notion of the use of words and private language. In section 3, I will shed light on pure phenomenal concepts (Chalmers 2010). Finally, I will show why the language categories cannot adequately capture the phenomenal concepts. I will conclude that language is never enough to grasp what one feels.

Keywords: concept, phenomenal state, private language, language-game.

INTRODUCTION

Justin Timberlake[1] sang, "I got this feelin' inside my bones It goes electric, wavy when I turn it on." He probably could not express how he felt in words or lyrics, so he resolved it with "I can't stop the feelin'. So just dance, dance, dance." Well, this is almost universal, and most of the time I feel like I am unable to talk. It is generally said that no matter how you feel, delighted or dejected, putting feelings into words somehow helps. What does language have to do with our feelings? Anthropological findings suggest that the relationship between language and feelings is so profound and fundamental that it is linked with the origin of our species. However, in recent times, a variety of interdisciplinary research has been conducted regarding language and feeling (phenomenal states of mind, including emotion, sensation, and others) within the discourses of philosophy, science, linguistics, and various domains. Linguistics investigations illustrate that almost all aspects of human spoken language communicate or at least try to communicate feelings. Algorithms that are applied to natural human language disclose that affective meanings envisage consequences in social-political behaviours. Anthropological and linguistic research proves that the meaning of sensation words is diverse around the world. More precisely, the denotation of the feeling terms is culture-specific. Phenomenal expressions have the propensity to be devised as a tool for cross-cultural communication.

Can we express exactly the way we feel? Are those phenomenal concepts of experience potentially effable? It is often said that before you express a feeling, you need to know what it is. Once we resonate with those phenomenal aspects of consciousness, we generally adduce specific terms to annotate exactly how we feel. However, the question remains the same: am I able to talk about my feelings? In section 1, I will discuss different notions of concepts. Section 2 will address the ineffability of the phenomenal mental states, specifically focusing on Wittgenstein's notion of the use of words and private language. In section 3, I will shed light on pure phenomenal concepts. Finally, I will conclude that language is never enough to grasp what one feels.

Reference and Phenomenal Concept

'Concept' is a layered term that can be characterised in several ways. Discussions regarding the notion of concept typically blur the boundaries of semantics and philosophy of mind. Largely, concepts are mental

[1] Justin R. Timberlake, "Can't Stop the Feeling!" Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd., Universal Music Publishing Group. 2016

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representations of things, properties, states of affairs, etc. In classical thinking, concepts were perceived as definitions celebrated by competent users. However, it is almost unambiguous that a single definition cannot survive forever. Hence, it cannot provide a justifiable ground for concepts. Sometimes, they are taken as mental representations, or they are even characterised as abstract objects. Some philosophers tied them with Fregean senses, while others fancy it as a recognitional term. Wittgenstein[2] suggested that concept formation is not about knowing the definition but acknowledging the function of a concept in thought and practice. Moreover, in his view, the identifier of a concept is not some closed set of attributes typically tokened by a definition, but rather it is the 'family resemblances[3]' among the things that contribute to the theory of concepts. In the latest philosophical developments, concepts are not recognised as internal realities, but they are facts about the outside milieu. In the philosophy of mind, concepts are seen as units of thought. There are mental states that include beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and others that involve a proposition. A propositional attitude of the form 'R thinks that S' has two parts. While the first part 'R thinks' denotes the subject's conscious mental state, the latter 'that S' unveils what that given mental state is about or the proposition (following Russell[4]). Concepts are supposed to be the constituents of the propositions articulated by conscious mental states. However, when we reflect upon conscious mental states, it seems that mental states are not always about something, but there are mental states that they feel in a certain way. There is "something like to be" in those states, and these states are coined as phenomenal mental states of consciousness.[5]

In this paper, I am trying to find out what sorts of concepts (if at all) may be involved in a mental state, so that the given mental state can grace the particular mental state *it is*. Feelings and beliefs are certainly different kinds of mental states. Experiences are purely phenomenal as they are characterized by *what it is like* to have them. As Nagal[6] had put that, there is *something it is like* to be a particular organism. Phenomenal Concepts are those one gets acquainted with by undergoing the relevant experience. One of the main reasons behind the popularity of the phenomenal concept is Frank Jackson's knowledge argument[7]. We are all familiar with the story of neuroscientist Mary, who has been kept locked in a black-and-white room since her birth. She has complete knowledge of seeing the colour red, though she has never actually seen red. Here, knowledge refers to the physical property or the neurological/physiological process regarding colour vision. Now, one day, she comes out of her room and encounters a red tomato in front of her. Thus, she realizes that it is what it is like to see something red. The conclusion is that Mary learns something new and that newness cannot be a physical property. She comes to know what it is like to experience red, or more precisely, she acquires the phenomenal concept of seeing red. No doubt Mary's discovery is a platform for many debates. But for the sake of this paper, I am bracketing them and considering that it is also exhausted with fine-grained phenomenal properties. The obvious question then occurs: what is a phenomenal concept? Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to pin down a single, unanimous response in the given framework. There is no straightforward answer to this. Philosophers like Brian Loar describe phenomenal concepts as direct recognitional concepts[8]. What he seems

[2] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), §§43, 138–142, 2009.

[3] See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§65–67, 2009.

[4] See Bertrand Russell, "Vagueness," The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 1, no. 2 (1923): 84–92, 1923.

[5] Following Montague, I believe that all mental states are phenomenal in their potential, be it belief state or feeling. The difference between them is phenomenological. The bipartite notion of intentional and phenomenal states of mind does not exist because consciousness typically involves phenomenology. But in the short term of this paper, I am bracketing that discussion.

[6] Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914.

[7] Jackson, Frank. "What Mary Didn't Know." *The Journal of Philosophy* 83, no. 5 (1986): 291–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026143.

[8] Loar, B. 1990/97. "Phenomenal states." Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, ed. J. Tomberlin: 81-108. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Revised version in *The Nature of Consciousness*, eds. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 597-616.

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to have in mind is that when a person is having a particular experience, s/he can dispose of a concept that refers directly to that experience. Loar also suggests that the mode of presentation of a phenomenal concept encompasses the experience itself. Unlike theoretical concepts, it is applied directly based on perceptual experience with the object. For example, in a new place, we can easily spot a new fashion statement that we have never seen before and pick out among others. We can even identify them in the future in the absence of the current instance. Because here the concept is linked with the capacity to form the image. Here, we are not depending upon any theoretical or background knowledge.

According to another trend, phenomenal concepts are indexical concepts that pick out brain states in indexical modes of presentation. So, they are thought of as indexical demonstratives that pick out phenomenal characters in the same manner demonstratives pick out objects in space. In this view, phenomenal concepts are concepts pointing to the experience itself in the context in which it occurs

Another way of explaining phenomenal concepts is in terms of their conceptual role. The typicality of a phenomenal concept lies in a distinct mode of reasoning. For them, Mary comes to know a new way of conceiving something that was already known to her. Some believe that phenomenal concepts are explained as quotational concepts. These are the concepts that contain the very mental state (phenomenal state) to which they refer. We can only acquire these concepts by employing the experience and then using them to introspectively pick out the phenomenal character of our experience.

Michael Tye identified Phenomenal Concepts with Causal-recognitional interpretations[9]. Tye claims that they are an unusual kind of recognitional concepts that refer directly. They are not accompanied by any such reference-fixing metaphors. Hence, their mode of presentation is empty. It denotes the causal connection they hold with their referents. Suppose there is a phenomenal concept P which refers to a phenomenal quality Q via P's being the concept that is exercised in introspection by the subject S if, and only if, under normal circumstances of introspection, Q is tokened in S's current experience and because Q is tokened. But how is it possible to recognise someone else's phenomenal state? There is no plausible response for this because phenomenal states necessarily involve subjective awareness, which presupposes the authority of the first person only. Tye thinks that to be a phenomenal concept, it is also supposed to undertake some kind of functional role to be public in the required sense. However, that cannot be defined a priori by disdaining phenomenal language.

Other philosophers have tried to explain the directedness of the reference of phenomenal concepts via demonstration. According to them, PCs are a sort of demonstrative. Perry[10] suggested that phenomenal concepts correspond to something like 'this qualitative character', where the demonstrative is guided by a perceptual state to its referent. Meanwhile, Levin[11] advocates that PCs are type demonstratives without any mode of presentation at all.

Carruthers, one of the exponents of the recognitional account of phenomenal concepts, suggests that phenomenal concepts are pure recognitional concepts. They don't retain any descriptive modes of presentation. Carruthers notices that it's our introspective judgments by which we get acquainted with our experiences. To validate that acquaintance, it is necessary to apply to the higher-order consciousness, that is, experiences of experiences, to guide our phenomenal concepts to their referents. On this account, a phenomenal concept should be able to embrace our direct awareness of the grounds for the application of a phenomenal concept, in such a way that it should not encompass any a priori connections with non-phenomenal concepts[12].

[9] Tye, Michael. "Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience." *Noûs* 36, no. 1 (March 2002): 137–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00365.

[10] See John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), esp. chap. 4, 2001.

[11] See Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. chap. 3, 2001.

[7] Carruthers, Peter. "Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68, no. 2 (March 2004): 316–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00343.x.

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Again, there are philosophers like Aydede and Guzeldere, who have propounded an information-theoretic analysis[13] of the typical relation that phenomenal concepts hold with sensory concepts. Here, it is believed that we are bound to obtain sensory concepts from our experiences. These sensory concepts have a dual identity, and they emanate into existence as phenomenal concepts when we exercise the same cognitive constructions in introspection.

One thing that must be acknowledged here is that all of those perspectives are intended to endorse some kind of physicalism. But that is not my purpose here. However, a successful account of the phenomenal concept must theorise an intimate connection between phenomenal states and the concepts that can be formulated out of them.

Phenomenal States and Communication

What does it mean by private language? Frankly speaking, private language often gets associated with emotion and sensation. But in what sense are phenomenal states private? According to Wittgenstein, only the subject of experience can be aware that s/ he is really in pain; others can only infer. These feelings cannot be expressed in ordinary language because words that the speaker refers subjected to his/her immediate private sensations only. Wittgenstein's private language argument[14] rejects the possibility of a language whose terms refer to inner experiences solely by means of private introspective acts, since such a language would lack criteria for correct application. Sensations and emotions are not denied reality; rather, the grammar of phenomenal concepts is grounded in public practices, expressive behaviour, and shared forms of life. First-person avowals of phenomenal states function expressively rather than as inner observational reports. Consequently, phenomenal concepts are not inner names of private qualia but acquire their meaning through their role in communal linguistic and practical activities. Hence, it is not conceivable to postulate the meaning. According to the conceivability principle, if something is not conceivable, then it is not logically possible. As we cannot adduce any objectively available meaning, it would be justified to claim such language is not possible. However, Wittgenstein settles down with the claim that private language is nothing more than gibberish. What makes private language incommunicable is that the connection between sensation words and whatever is going on outside the mind is contingent. The paradigm of private experience is not that each individual possesses his exemplar, but that nobody knows whether further subjects can also feel the same or not. Wittgenstein puts forward his disagreement largely through the consideration of "pain" as the subject's feeling or intrinsic experience. It is indisputable that every person has inner experience, but how do we convey our inner sensations or inner feelings? How can that sensation be revealed through something similar to language that is at the same time exclusively clutched by the language user himself, rather than through the public language? Wittgenstein invites us to envisage a child who intends to describe his/her feeling of a toothache and desires to name such a personal feeling, but without the usual vocabulary. for example. Unfortunately, the word that the child uses to designate the toothache cannot be apprehended by anyone else. One might think that when the child clarifies to others about his/her utterance, then others must comprehend the meaning of the new name for the toothache. But that is also contingent, and nothing could be ascertained in the given panorama. Therefore, naming is not fundamentally accomplishable in the sphere of private language, even if we agree to the prospect of the existence of private language for the sake of the given discussion. When one makes an effort to name a sensation, one just overlooks the fact that naming is just not labeling, but it is a matter of epithet. Naming necessarily presupposes the premise that the act of naming makes sense objectively. When we talk about naming, we also presume the existence of grammar. Imagine a situation where the subject term S designates an inner sensation that frequently repeats itself. S/He decides to put a mark in their phone calendar whenever it occurs. On closer scrutiny, it could be realised that formulation of any term is taking place in this scenario, rather than one can only stretch to a kind of ostensive definition. Therefore, Wittgenstein believes that we cannot name the sensation in the ordinary sense if we cannot give a clear definition referring to its use.

[13] See Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, "Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Account of Phenomenal Concepts," Noûs 39, no. 2 (2005): 197–255, 2005.

[14] See, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), §§243–271, 2009.

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However, we are left with the reality check that when we speak or write the term, we at the same time quintessence our attention on the sensation. I can make a connection between the term and the intrinsic feeling. But still, one cannot guarantee about measure of correctness in the context. Again, visualize someone who has felt a particular sensation for the first time and names it "Ah". In the future, when he is again acquainted with such a sensation, he will be using the same word. According to Wittgenstein, the whole process is meaningless.

Wittgenstein excluded the view that words possess special meanings that define how the world is. Instead, he propounds that words earn their meaning from how they are used in public discourse for given determinations. His employment of grammar depicts the specific rules that regulate the use of the given term. For him, sensations are not merely behaviours; rather, they are contingently related to a separate world of private experience. He summoned the concept of *language games* to authenticate the idea that words are always used within the panorama of social performances with a particular motivation. A similar word can be used in different ways in some other language games. In his own words,

The meaning of the utterance ''Slab!'' depends upon whether one is involved in the language game of naming an object (i.e., ''that is a 'slab''') or making a request (i.e., ''bring me the slab''). [15]

Wittgenstein emphasized that individual subjects of experience do not have any privilege in expressing internal states. He asserts that phenomenological terms do not necessarily assign to internal private mental states that are devoid of the perspectives of others. People do not learn to identify their feelings or emotions only by introspecting and then stipulating identifiers to their experience. However, without public standards, where people can refer to and confirm the accuracy of a given term, there would be no way to deduce whether or not the term has been employed appropriately. The celebrated illustration of a beetle in a box is a depiction of the above scenario:

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? – If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.[16]

Wittgenstein successfully figures out that natural phenomenological expressions (sensations, emotions, etc.) yield public standards for forming rules governing the use of phenomenological concepts in everyday speech. When a child knocks his/her feet at the corner of the table, s/he starts to scream or cry out and probably rubs the affected area. This public expression provides the standards for the construction of a grammar for the concept of pain. Thereupon, when a child exhibits pain behaviour, adults teach the child the particular language games that reveal the meaning of the term pain. In the above situation, the child might, instead of crying, say 'Ouch', or 'I am in pain'. In this way, phenomenological terms gain their meaning through public discourse and not through private introspection. According to Wittgenstein, once accomplished, expressions such as 'ouch' or 'I am in pain' function as substitutions for natural sensation responses. For Wittgenstein, phenomenological experience is immediate and interpretation of phenomenological experience in language also is possible, but only as a form of reflective activity and not as a course of private introspection.

What he denied is the possibility of private language only. For him, phenomenal states are available for interpersonal communication. Following Papineau, it can be said that we first name a sensation by turning our gaze inside. Then we observe the outside world what causes that sensation or the behaviour the sensation

[15] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), §§2–7, 2009.

[16] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), §293, 2009.

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causes. Using analogy, we communicate with language about what we feel. We learn from the community. Here, we need to separate two notions, though they appear similar yet, fundamentally they are different. The subjective feeling of conscious experience is not identical to the expression of the subjective feeling of that very experience. What the subject feels about the experiential given object is private, and Wittgenstein's argument is not intended to refute that. Rather, there is no dispute over the acceptance of intrinsic subjective feeling and the authority of the subject over it. What he is categorically trying to defy is the ineffability of phenomenological terms. His sense of phenomenological expression is not individualistic; rather, he emphasises communal subjectivity. Wittgenstein is a firm believer in the consensual *forms of life*[17] of a community of language users. At this point, there is a great enticement among philosophers to settle down with a kind of deduction that phenomenological states are both epistemologically and metaphysically irrelevant and void. They are kind of empty terms or no terms at all. This paper strongly declares that this temptation should be repelled. The point I want to make is that Wittgenstein's negation of private language as the justification of the meaning of subjective feeling does not entail that these phenomena lack other cognitive value and are therefore irrelevant to philosophy.

Papineau[18] also claims that we must be able to introspectively focus on the experiences when we have them and recreate them imaginatively at other times. So phenomenal concepts are demonstrative. We can form sentences with them, and the structure will be like the experience. Now the gap can be filled either with an occurrent token experience or the imaginative recreation of an experience. According to this demonstrative structure, the essence of the phenomenal concept is mental images.

Pure Phenomenal Concept

But there is something more that makes this concept different from any other kind of concept, which is 'pure phenomenality[19]'. Mary looks at the red tomato and gets the experience (phenomenal) of colour. This experience gives rise to a phenomenal property that, in turn, initiates the phenomenal concept of phenomenal redness R. There is no doubt in the fact that her experience is not red in the same way the tomato is red, but that does not mean there is nothing in the experience, and whatever you get through inward perception is the external features only. Phenomenal redness (the feature of the subject's experience) and external redness (the feature of the external object) are different but both are respectable properties of their own. Consider the public-language expression 'red experience'. The reference of this term is connected via a relation to certain red objects in the external world, which is ostended in learning the public language term 'red'. A learner learns to address the experience that is initiated by this object, 'red' (phenomenal sense), and to designate the object that typically brings out this experience, 'red' (external sense). Here, the phenomenal concept is relational. The relational phenomenal concept can be distinguished in two ways, depending on its way of reference fixation. Either it can be determined by the whole community of the subjects, or it can be specified by the subject in question. The first can be called the *community relational concept or* red_C, which is typically caused in normal subjects within a community by red things only. The second can be regarded as the *individual relational concept or* red_I, which is caused in an individual by the red things. At first sight, it is natural to postulate that the two concepts red_C and red_I are identical, but this is only true for normal subjects. They may yield different results for a contingent circumstance. For example, the inverted subject's (red/green) concept of red_C refers to phenomenal redness (what the community calls), but its concept of red_I refers to phenomenal greenness (what the community calls). When seeing the tomato, Mary can refer to the associated experience by saying 'that sort of experience', where the phenomenal concept gets expressed indexically as *E*. This demonstrative concept functions by picking out the particular feature that the subject is currently ostending. Like all other demonstratives, it fixes its reference by picking out the feature that is ostended. These three concepts red_C, red_I, and *E*, typically cite the same phenomenal concept that is phenomenal redness in terms of its connection

[17] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), §§19, 23, 241, 2009.

[18] See David Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), chap. 4, 2002.

[19] See David J. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. chaps. 8–9, 2010.

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via the object of ostension. According to Chalmers, there is another phenomenal concept[5] which is neither relational nor indexical, rather completely intrinsic, which can be called a *pure phenomenal concept* or *R*. When Mary looks at the red for the first time, she gets to know what it is like to see red, and that is essentially her subjective feeling. In a way that can be regarded as private, also. The concept *R* is all the way different from red_C, red_I, and *E*. We form the belief that $red_C = R$, that is, this feature is caused in the community by red things, and similarly, we are also inclined to postulate that $red_I = R$. However, we might also hold the belief that *E* = R by the denotation of the object. The relation between red_C, red_I, and *E* on one hand and *R* on the other is not a priori, because the pure phenomenal concept is independent of them. Here, one can reasonably ask how the phenomenal concept can ever be independent as such when it is initiated by an external object (at least in the case of Mary). To find out this answer, first we need to understand that what we feel is not governed by the external world rigidly. My phenomenal concept of red is indeed about the external tomato, but one can have the same experience in the absence of the object altogether. Even the same red can be felt differently in two subjects, which yields two different phenomenal concepts for them. Hence, we must accept that the *pure phenomenal concept* or *R* is strictly subject-specific.

Inverted Mary

Consider Inverted Mary, who is a physical–functional twin of the famous scientist Mary, but the only difference is that her colour spectrum is inverted. Like Mary, inverted Mary also gets aware of something new when she encounters the tomato for the first time. But there are obvious differences. Where Mary learns that tomato causes phenomenal redness or *R* (what we call), inverted Mary learns that tomato causes phenomenal greenness or *G* (what we call), though she is uttering it red. Now, if we apply the previous concepts in this context, then we will find out that for Mary $red_C = R$, $red_I = R$ and $E = R$, but for Inverted Mary $red_C = G$, $red_I = G$ and $E = G$. Even if inverted, Mary says, "Ah! Now I know what it is like to see red." She possesses the concept of green, though her denotation is red. It all indicates one thing: we cannot grasp what is inside by something that is quite external, such as the use of language. No matter how much effort we put into holding it, there will always be something that will come out of the fist.

Final Remark

It is almost like a slogan that communication is the key to living in society, be it verbal or nonverbal (behavioural). Apart from that, we all need to express ourselves. If our feelings get hidden inside and never come to the surface, that may hinder our growth as human beings and, in turn, the whole species. Living in this world, we get acquainted with so many experiences every time that make us realize the famous coinage "what it is like to have a particular experience". Philosophers, who have tried to refer to pure phenomenal concepts in other terms (indexical, relational, etc.), are not always against the phenomenal state. Rather, what they want to criticise is the private subjective existence of phenomenal concepts. For them, something to be subject-specific does not mean that it is private. So, they have introduced the notion of interpersonal communication to grasp the inner through the outer.

I am also not against the communication of what is in the mind, and I want to shout out loud in front of the world what is inside, but unfortunately, I cannot. Because I do not feel that the linguistic concepts are enough to do justice to the phenomenal concepts. First, in the case of inverted Mary, she does not even know she has a radically different phenomenal concept compared to the community. Then how could it be registered by the paradigms of language? Secondly, two subjects (normal) from the same community can have two different phenomenal concepts regarding the same object. Imagine the typical taste of bourbon whiskey, which, according to some subjects, is sweeter than regular whisky, while others find it completely normal, which makes them form different concepts around it. This point can be countered by the claim of "form of life", that is, one is typically used to with a certain kind of taste, while the other is not. If we consider this claim, we cannot rule out completely the probability of different phenomenal experiences of the same object. Thirdly, the same subject may have different phenomenal experiences regarding an object with different intervals of time or context. For example, the typical homemade rice and lentils give us a completely different experience when it is consumed after a whole day of fasting, which in turn gives rise to a particular type of phenomenal concept. But for some other day, it might be experienced not so differently. Finally, our linguistic vocabulary is too short to grasp the phenomenal concepts. Imagine the use of the word 'happy', we refer to it to denote many

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different kinds of mental (phenomenal) states, hence concepts. Seeing the first rain we say "Ah! I am happy." We kind of express the same way with a good academic result or watching a favourite series or after having ice cream and so on. So, all we can say is that "I am happy." Does the linguistic concept 'happy' include all of them? If the answer is yes, then it is an umbrella concept, whose members are infinite in number, which leads to infinite regress, hence cannot be a satisfactory position. But if the answer is negative, then the next task is to find out which phenomenal concepts subsume it and why. This position does not make any sense because it looks like something is called by a name that is not that. Phenomenal concepts are so associated with our daily lives that we all can introspectively conjecture that all those phenomenal experiences expressed by the word 'happy' are different from each other.

I am not insisting that we cannot ever express any phenomenal concepts by the medium of language. We can convey some phenomenal concepts, but not all. There are some feelings (in turn concepts) that originated with the social structure, for example, the feeling of shame. Still, it can get altered from person to person. It has a lot to do with how the person has evolved, his/her lived experiences, and the perspectives s/he has embraced. Sometimes phenomenal concepts can indeed be identified with interpersonal concepts, but not all. There will always remain some phenomenal concepts that are extremely private and a matter of subjective identification only.

AI USE: I have used Grammarly for proofreading.

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