The Psychology and Economics of Choice: Decision-Making Biases, Heuristics, And Behavioural Interventions
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Human decision-making occupies a complex intersection between economic rationality and psychological reality. Classical economic theory posits that individuals select among alternatives in a manner that maximises utility; however, behavioural research consistently demonstrates that real-world choices are shaped by cognitive biases, emotional states, social influences, and the architecture of the choice environment. This paper examines the theoretical and empirical foundations of the psychology and economics of choice, with the objective of providing a comprehensive account of why individuals systematically deviate from purely rational behaviour. Drawing on Herbert Simon's concept of bounded rationality, Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory, heuristic-based decision models, and Thaler and Sunstein's nudge theory, the study analyses the mechanisms through which deviations from rational choice can be predicted and, where appropriate, corrected. Key cognitive biases reviewed include anchoring, framing effects, loss aversion, the halo effect, the endowment effect, hyperbolic discounting, the decoy effect, confirmation bias, status quo bias, the bandwagon effect, availability bias, and overconfidence bias. The study further explores the paradox of choice—the counterintuitive finding that an excess of options diminishes rather than enhances decision satisfaction—and the practical applications of nudge theory across public health, personal finance, and public administration. The results of this conceptual analysis indicate that individual decision-making is not a product of deliberate rational computation but rather the outcome of a dynamic interaction between cognitive limitations, emotional states, and environmental framing. By integrating insights from behavioural economics and cognitive psychology, this paper argues that thoughtfully designed choice environments can guide individuals toward welfare-enhancing outcomes without undermining personal autonomy.
Downloads
References
Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions. HarperCollins.
Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious. Penguin.
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302(5649), 1338–1339. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1091721
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Madrian, B. C., & Shea, D. F. (2001). The power of suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1149–1187. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265543
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man: Social and rational. Wiley.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press.
Weinmann, M., Schneider, C., & vom Brocke, J. (2016). Digital nudging: Guiding online user choices through interface design. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 58(6), 433–436. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-016-0453-1

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
All articles published in our journal are licensed under CC-BY 4.0, which permits authors to retain copyright of their work. This license allows for unrestricted use, sharing, and reproduction of the articles, provided that proper credit is given to the original authors and the source.