

Political Economy of Solid Minerals Governance in Nasarawa State, Nigeria: A Rentier State Analysis (1999 - 2020)

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ABSTRACT

Nasarawa State is widely described as the “home of solid minerals” because metallic, industrial, and gemstone resources are distributed across its thirteen local government areas. Despite this abundance, the governance of solid minerals in Nigeria places ownership and control under the Federal Government. Anchored in Rentier State Theory, this paper examines the political economy of solid minerals governance in Nasarawa State between 1999 and 2020, focusing on how dependence on external oil rents shapes subnational incentives to exploit local mineral wealth. The study adopted a mixed-method design combining a cross-sectional survey with key-informant interviews, supported by documentary and institutional analysis. The survey covered 400 respondents drawn from thirteen purposively selected mining-affected wards and villages, and from relevant institutions; 376 questionnaires returned were used for analysis while unstructured interviews with selected stakeholders provided additional insight. Documentary evidence from official reports, policy documents, budgets, and published sources was used. The study finds that the state is permitted to participate only as a corporate actor and revenue collector, but not as a regulator, and has largely relied on federation account instead of building a robust solid minerals economy. Evidence attributes the state’s weak interest in solid minerals to its dependence on oil revenue, while existing state-level instruments for mineral revenue collection are perceived as ineffective. The paper concludes that Nasarawa’s status as a subnational rentier state explains the paradox of mineral abundance and underdevelopment and calls for reforms that strengthen state capacity, improve transparency in derivation, and create incentives for solid minerals governance.

Keywords: Economic Development; Federalism; Governance; Rentier State; Solid Minerals;

INTRODUCTION

Nasarawa State, created in 1996, has become renowned in Nigerian discourse as the “home of solid minerals” because of the diversity and spread of its mineral resources (Obaje et al., 2007). Geological evidence shows that the state hosts basement complex rocks, sedimentary formations, and younger granites, making it a microcosm of Nigeria’s broader geology (Obaje et al., 2007). Adewumi and Salako (2017) and Ezeaku (2012) further affirm that the rocks in the state host significant deposits of gold, barite, coal, tin, gemstones, marble, copper, limestone, clay, glass sand, columbite, and tantalite across several local government areas. Ibrahim (2016), citing former Nasarawa State Governor Tanko Al-Makura, notes that Nasarawa has more than twenty-seven solid mineral resources that could generate substantial foreign income. On the surface, this endowment should position the state as a major mineral economy.

Yet mineral abundance alone has not attracted sufficient investors or driven development. Proven reserves, efficient legal frameworks, credible fiscal regimes, and supportive infrastructure are necessary conditions for investment, and these have been largely inadequate in Nasarawa and Nigeria more broadly (Gyang, Nanle, &

Chollom, 2010; Eyre & Agba, 2007). Available data show that only a few minerals in Nasarawa - such as barite, clay, glass sand and marble - have quantified inferred reserves, and even these surveys were undertaken over three decades ago (Eyre & Agba, 2007; Nasarawa State Government, n.d.). At the same time, the governance of solid minerals in Nigeria is constitutionally located on the exclusive legislative list, meaning that the Federal Government retains primary authority over ownership, licensing, royalties, and supervision (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Minerals and Mining Act, 2007). Section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution vests “the entire property in and control of all minerals in, under or upon any land in Nigeria” in the federal government, to be managed as prescribed by the National Assembly (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). This arrangement creates a structural tension: Nasarawa State is mineral-rich but does not control the key levers of sectoral governance.

To explain this paradox, the broader research on which this article draws is organized around Rentier State Theory, which emphasizes how dependence on externally generated rents, rather than domestically produced revenue, shapes state behavior and development outcomes (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987). The study extends this logic to subnational Nigeria, arguing that Nasarawa functions as a rentier state at the state level, heavily dependent on oil-derived federation account transfers, and therefore lacking strong incentives to pursue complex, contested solid minerals governance. The central question in this paper is: How does the rentier character of Nasarawa State interact with the federal legal framework for solid minerals to shape governance and development outcomes between 1999 and 2020?

Conceptual Clarification

This section clarifies the key concepts that underpin the analysis: solid minerals, governance of solid minerals, rentier state, and economic development.

Solid Minerals

In the Nigerian policy context, “solid minerals” refers to non-fluid mineral resources such as metallic ores (for example, gold, tin, columbite, iron), industrial minerals (for example, limestone, barite, gypsum, clay, glass sand), and gemstones (for example, sapphire, tourmaline) that are extracted from the earth’s crust for economic use (National Minerals and Metals Policy, 2008; Obaje et al., 2007). Solid minerals are distinguished from liquid and gaseous resources such as crude oil and natural gas, and they underpin sectors like construction, manufacturing, agriculture (through fertilizers), and jewelry. Nasarawa State’s claim to be the “home of solid minerals” rests on the presence of these diverse mineral types across its thirteen local government areas (Obaje et al., 2007; Adewumi & Salako, 2017).

Governance of Solid Minerals

Governance of solid minerals in this paper refers to the formal and informal rules, institutions, and processes that shape the exploration, exploitation, regulation, and distribution of benefits from solid minerals. Formally, the 1999 Constitution, the Minerals and Mining Act 2007, the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations 2011, and the National Minerals and Metals Policy 2008 define who owns mineral resources, who issues licenses, how royalties and fees are collected, and which agencies supervise operations (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Minerals and Mining Act, 2007; Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011; National Minerals and Metals Policy, 2008). Informally, governance also includes the practices of artisanal miners, local power brokers, and bureaucrats, including corruption, leakages, and enforcement gaps noted in Nasarawa’s revenue collection experience (Nasarawa State Government, 2018; National Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Premium Times, 2012).

In a federal system, governance of solid minerals is multi-level: the federal government owns and regulates minerals on the “bedrock”, while state governments administer land on the “top soil” under the Land Use Act but have limited direct authority over extraction (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Minerals and Mining Act, 2007). This distinction is crucial for understanding Nasarawa’s constrained role despite its resource endowment.

Political Economy

Political economy refers to the relationship between political power, institutions, interests, and economic outcomes. It examines how rules, authority, and competing interests shape the production, distribution, and use of resources within a society. In that sense, political economy is concerned not only with markets and growth, but also with the political structures that determine who controls resources, who benefits from them, and how development outcomes are produced (Ake, 1981; Copestake & Williams, 2014).

In this paper, the concept is useful because the governance of solid minerals in Nasarawa State cannot be understood only as a legal or technical issue. It is also a question of power, incentives, and institutional behavior, especially in a context where the Federal Government controls mineral ownership and the state depends heavily on oil-based transfers from the federation account (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Minerals and Mining Act, 2007; Nasarawa State Government, 2010–2019). Political economy therefore helps explain why some policy choices persist even when they appear to limit diversification and local revenue generation (Ake, 1981; Copestake & Williams, 2014).

Political economy also draws attention to the role of formal institutions and informal practices in shaping development outcomes. Where institutions are weak, incentives may favour rent-seeking, corruption, and short-term gains rather than productive investment and long-term planning, especially in resource-rich settings (Ake, 1981; Copestake & Williams, 2014). For Nasarawa State, this makes political economy a useful bridge between the legal framework for mineral governance and the broader argument of the paper, which is that state behavior is shaped by revenue dependence and institutional control (Nasarawa State Government, 2018; Premium Times, 2012).

Rentier State

Rentier state is a political economy concept used to describe states that derive a substantial share of their income from external rents - payments from abroad for natural resources or strategic assets - rather than from domestic productive activity and taxation (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987). In classic formulations, rentier states exhibit four core features: rents constitute the predominant national revenue; the domestic productive sector is weak and highly specialized in a single commodity; a limited proportion of the population participates in generating the rents; and the state is the principal recipient and distributor of the rent (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987).

Rentier State Theory was developed to explain why oil-rich economies struggle to diversify, why state institutions become bloated and inefficient, and why democratic accountability is weak when governments can fund themselves without taxing citizens (Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999). In this paper, Nasarawa State is treated as a subnational rentier state: it relies heavily on oil-financed federation account transfers, receives limited solid minerals revenue, and therefore has weak incentives to invest in complex solid minerals governance or build a broad tax base (Premium Times, 2012; Nasarawa State Government, 2010 - 2019). The rentier concept is used not simply as a label but as a framework to interpret Nasarawa's policy choices, budgetary patterns, and institutional behaviour.

Economic Development

Economic development is used here in its standard sense as the process whereby low-income economies are transformed into more modern, diversified economies, involving both quantitative growth and qualitative improvements in living standards, institutions, and infrastructure (Todaro & Smith, 2011; Britannica, 2025). Unlike economic growth, which focuses narrowly on increases in output or GDP, economic development encompasses changes in sectoral structure, employment, income distribution, and access to basic services.

In the context of Nasarawa State, economic development implies moving from a predominantly agrarian, low-productivity economy towards a more diversified structure in which solid minerals, agriculture, manufacturing, and services contribute to higher per capita income, better infrastructure, and improved social indicators

(Nasarawa State Government, 2009; Akongwale, Ayodele, & Udefuna, 2013). The central question is whether and how solid minerals governance, under rentier conditions, can support such a transformation.

Theoretical Framework: Rentier State Theory

Rentier State Theory (RST) provides the main analytical lens for this study. Originating in work on Middle Eastern oil exporters, RST explains how reliance on external rents shapes state-society relations, institutional design, and development trajectories (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Luciani, 1987). The broader political economy literature shows how resource dependence can weaken accountability, distort incentives, and constrain diversification (Ake, 1981; Corden, 1984; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999; Sachs & Warner, 1995). Rents are commonly discussed in the rentier-state literature as externally generated income that allows government to rely less on taxation and more on resource-based transfers (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Luciani, 1987).

The key intuition of RST is that “no representation without taxation” is reversed in rentier contexts: because the state can fund itself through external rents rather than domestic taxation, it is under less pressure to negotiate with citizens over policy and accountability (Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999). This leads to:

1. Weak fiscal connection between citizens and the state.
2. Elite focus on distributing rents and maintaining political quiescence rather than building productive sectors.
3. Difficulty diversifying economies away from the main rent-generating commodity.

In Nigeria, oil rents have long underpinned federal budgets, and scholars have linked this to governance weaknesses and underdevelopment (Arnold, 1997; Sachs & Warner, 1995). The study extends RST to Nasarawa by conceptualizing the state as a subnational rentier: its budget depends heavily on oil-financed federation transfers, it receives limited solid minerals revenue, and its political leadership has tended to play “lip service” to solid minerals development without sustained investment (Nasarawa State Government, 2010–2019; Premium Times, 2012).

RST is therefore used to interpret Nasarawa’s governance of solid minerals: the centralized legal framework, limited state role, weak implementation of revenue laws, and tolerance of informal mining are all seen as consistent with a rentier logic in which external rents reduce incentives for complex domestic sector development (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Karl, 1997).

METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a mixed-method design combining a cross-sectional survey with key-informant interviews, complemented by documentary and institutional analysis. The survey covered 400 respondents drawn from thirteen purposively selected mining-affected wards and villages in Nasarawa State - Gwanje, Azara, Alagye-Ruwan Baka, Alosi, Panda/Kare, Jigwada-Sabon Gida, Garaku-Tattara, Shabu, Kagbu-Wana, Adudu, Odu-Udege Mbeki, Ugya, and Gitta-Gongon - and from relevant institutions, including the Nasarawa State Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Commerce, Industries and Cooperatives, the Ministry of Finance, Budget and Planning, and licensed mineral title holders. Respondents were selected purposively on the basis of their direct exposure to solid minerals governance and its revenue effects, while sample allocation across strata was determined proportionately. Of the 400 questionnaires administered, 376 were returned and used for analysis.

The instrument comprised both closed- and open-ended items and was complemented by unstructured interviews with selected officials, miners, and community stakeholders. Additional evidence was obtained from official documents, policy reports, budgets, and published sources. Quantitative data were analyzed descriptively using tables and charts, while interview data were used to contextualize and triangulate the survey findings.

Statistical data from the National Bureau of Statistics on states’ disaggregated mining and quarrying output provide context on Nasarawa’s production levels and the dominance of artisanal and small-scale mining (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Ogezi, 2005).

Although the wider study includes survey and interview data, this article uses only those results that illuminate rentier dynamics and perceptions of solid minerals governance, such as respondents' views on dependence on oil revenue and the effectiveness of the state's revenue law (Premium Times, 2012; National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The time frame of 1999 - 2020 reflects the period during which the Fourth Republic Constitution and the key mining laws were in force, as well as the years covered by the state's policy and budgetary efforts (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Minerals and Mining Act, 2007; Nasarawa State Government, 2000, 2009, 2010 - 2019).

RESULTS

Historical and Legal Context of Solid Minerals Governance

Mining activities in the area that now constitutes Nasarawa State began during the colonial period, when exploration, exploitation, and exportation were carried out primarily by foreign interests (Mobbs, 2004). After independence, mining declined as oil was discovered and became the dominant source of national revenue, a shift consistent with resource and "Dutch disease" patterns identified in the broader literature (Corden, 1984; Sachs & Warner, 1995). The 1972 indigenisation decree, poor performance of federal mining enterprises, and unfavourable conditions in mineral markets further contributed to the decline in solid minerals exploration (Mobbs, 2004; Eyre & Agba, 2007).

With the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, solid minerals regulation remained on the exclusive list, reinforcing federal control over the sector (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Section 44(3) of the Constitution vests ownership and control of all minerals in, under, or upon any land in Nigeria in the federal government, to be managed as prescribed by the National Assembly (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The Minerals and Mining Act 2007 elaborates this authority by defining licensing processes, mineral titles, and royalty payments, while the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations 2011 and the National Minerals and Metals Policy 2008 provide operational and policy guidance (Minerals and Mining Act, 2007; Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011; National Minerals and Metals Policy, 2008).

The legal framework governing solid minerals in Nasarawa reveals a clear tension between federal ownership and limited state participation. Table 1 presents the constitutional and statutory instruments that shape this relationship and shows the limited space available to the state within the federal mining regime.

Table 1: Legal Framework for Solid Minerals Governance in Nasarawa State

Legal Instrument	Core Provision	Effect on Nasarawa State
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria	Vest ownership and control of all minerals in, under, or upon any land in Nigeria in the Federal Government	Removes constitutional ownership and direct regulatory control from the state.

Minerals and Mining Act 2007	Centralizes licensing, mineral titles, royalties, and supervision under federal authority. Allows state participation only as a corporate entity or licensed operator.	Permits participation only in a limited corporate capacity, not regulator.
Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011	Provides operational procedures for licensing, environmental compliance, and mineral development.	Reinforces the federal regulatory regime and limits subnational discretion.
National Minerals and Metals Policy, 2008	Sets national policy direction for mineral sector development, diversification, and value addition.	Frames state action within a federal policy architecture rather than independent state control.
Nasarawa State Environmental Degradation Control and Revenue Collection Law 2018	Empowers the state to collect specific mineral-related fees, development levies, surface rent, haulage-related charges.	Creates a local revenue tool, but not ownership or regulatory authority over minerals.

As shown in Table 1, Nasarawa's legal authority over solid minerals is limited to revenue collection and corporate participation, while ownership and core regulatory powers remain vested in the Federal Government.

These instruments create a centralised governance framework in which solid minerals are regulated from the centre, and subnational governments like Nasarawa have no constitutional ownership or regulatory authority over minerals within their territories (Minerals and Mining Act, 2007; Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011). Nasarawa can participate in mining only as a license-holding corporate entity and relies on derivation and federation account transfers for revenue, reproducing a rentier pattern at the state level (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987).

Nasarawa's Formal Role and Rentier Dependence

Under the Minerals and Mining Act, the Nasarawa State Government is permitted to participate in mining and exploration of solid minerals, but only in the capacity of a registered corporate entity or agency that obtains licenses; it cannot act as a regulator over the sector (Minerals and Mining Act, 2007). If the state or its agencies obtain licenses, they are required to pay royalties to the Federal Government just like any other license holder (Minerals and Mining Act, 2007). Constitutionally, Nasarawa is entitled to 13% derivation from mineral - derived revenues, but public statements by state officials suggest that the state has received little or no substantial revenue from this source (Premium Times, 2012).

Nasarawa's Economic Summit (2000) and Vision 2020 Stakeholders Development Committee Report (2009) set out ambitious plans to harness solid minerals through public - private partnerships, resuscitation of the Nasarawa Minerals Development Company, establishment of laboratories, lapidary centres, and mineral exhibition facilities, and significant budgetary allocations (Nasarawa State Government, 2000, 2009). However, budget evidence between 2010 and 2019 shows that these pledges were rarely matched by actual releases; allocations for mineral surveys, exhibitions, and exploration were approved but often not disbursed (Nasarawa State Government, 2010 - 2019).

Survey data from the broader study reveal that 64% of respondents agree or strongly agree that reliance on oil revenue from the federation account is one of the major factors responsible for the decline of the Nasarawa State Government's interest in solid minerals exploration (Premium Times, 2012). The Director of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance explicitly links dependence on oil rent to weak diversification, arguing that solid minerals and agriculture must be prioritised if the state is to make appreciable gains in internally generated revenue. These findings support the rentier interpretation that Nasarawa's budgetary dependence on external oil rents reduces the urgency of building a complex, locally grounded solid minerals governance regime (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987).

Environmental Degradation Control and Revenue Collection Law 2018

To address environmental degradation and local revenue needs, Nasarawa State enacted the **Environmental Degradation Control and Revenue Collection Law 2018** (Nasarawa State Government, 2018). Section C of this law empowers the state to collect mineral-related revenue or fees for activities such as crushing, extraction, cutting and polishing of rocks, haulage of quarried rock products, haulage of sharp sand, gravel and laterite, and development levy from mineral vendors (Nasarawa State Government, 2018). The law also permits the collection of surface rent per cadastral unit (0.2 km²) on metallic, industrial, and gem minerals, with specified amounts payable per unit (Nasarawa State Government, 2018).

This law creates a potential local revenue framework that could help Nasarawa reduce rentier dependence by generating internally sourced mineral revenue (Nasarawa State Government, 2018; Mahdavy, 1970). However, evidence from the study shows that implementation has been weak. Survey responses indicate that a majority of respondents perceive the collection of surface rent and mineral fees based on the 2018 law as ineffective or very ineffective, and official commentary acknowledges leakages, corruption, and limited capacity (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Premium Times, 2012).

These perceptions indicate that Nasarawa has not been able to fully use the 2018 law to build a robust, internally generated mineral revenue base, reinforcing its reliance on federation account transfers and its status as a subnational rentier state (Beblawi, 1987; Premium Times, 2012).

Production Structure and Artisanal Mining

National Bureau of Statistics data show that Nasarawa State produced solid minerals in each year between 2010 and 2015, but volumes were modest relative to national totals (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Despite its resource endowment, development in the state is dominated by **artisanal and small-scale miners (ASSM)**, who often operate informally with limited capital and rudimentary methods (Ogezi, 2005). The study notes that about 90 - 95% of solid minerals in Nigeria generally are produced by such miners, and that in Nasarawa they lack sufficient funds, under-utilize their concessions, and rely heavily on manual labour.

While artisanal mining generates some employment and local income, it also leads to land degradation, erosion, pollution, and safety hazards, and makes it difficult for the state to quantify production and collect royalties and fees (Ezeaku, 2012; Azobu, 2015). The prevalence of informal mining reflects both the absence of large-scale, coordinated investment and the weaknesses of governance. From a rentier perspective, the state's reliance on external oil rents has meant that it has not built the institutional capacity needed to formalise artisanal mining, generate reliable data, and integrate the sector into a broader developmental strategy (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987).

DISCUSSION

The findings support the interpretation of Nasarawa as a **subnational rentier state** operating within a federally centralised solid minerals regime. At the federal level, oil exports provide substantial external rents that fund the federation account, from which Nasarawa receives significant transfers (Arnold, 1997; Sachs & Warner, 1995). At the state level, these transfers decouple revenue from domestic production and taxation, weakening the pressure on political elites to develop sectors such as solid minerals and agriculture (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987).

Rentier State Theory helps explain three interconnected patterns in Nasarawa's solid minerals governance:

Limited incentives for diversification: Ambitious plans for solid minerals development in state policy documents are rarely backed by actual budget releases, and dependence on federation account transfers reduces the urgency of harnessing Nasarawa's mineral endowment (Nasarawa State Government, 2000, 2009, 2010 - 2019; Obaje et al., 2007; Ibrahim, 2016).

Weak implementation of local revenue instruments: The Environmental Degradation Control and Revenue Collection Law 2018 could support significant internally generated mineral revenue, but implementation has been ineffective due to corruption, leakages, and low capacity (Nasarawa State Government, 2018; National Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Premium Times, 2012).

Tolerance of informal, low-productivity mining: Artisanal and small-scale mining dominates production, with limited formal oversight and data, generating some income but reinforcing an enclave-like, low-productivity sector that the state does not fully integrate into a long-term development plan (Ogezi, 2005; Ezeaku, 2012; Azobu, 2015).

These patterns are coherent with rentier expectations: easy external rents discourage investment in complex domestic sectors, weaken accountability, and allow informal extraction to persist without being turned into an organised driver of development (Mahdavy, 1970; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999).

CONCLUSION

This article has examined the political economy of solid minerals governance in Nasarawa State, Nigeria, by analysing constitutional provisions, mining legislation, national policy documents, state reports and budgets, and Nasarawa's Environmental Degradation Control and Revenue Collection Law 2018 through the lens of **Rentier State Theory**. The findings show that the 1999 Constitution and the Minerals and Mining Act 2007 vest ownership and control of minerals in the Federal Government, placing licensing, royalties, and supervision under centralised authority (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Minerals and Mining Act, 2007). Nasarawa State is

permitted to participate in mining as a corporate actor that must obtain licenses and pay royalties, but it does not function as a regulator over the sector (Minerals and Mining Act, 2007; Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2011).

At the same time, Nasarawa's budget is heavily financed from the federation account, sustained by oil rents, and this dependence has dampened incentives to pursue solid minerals exploration and diversification (Premium Times, 2012; Nasarawa State Government, 2010 - 2019). The state's own revenue law allows for the collection of fees and surface rent, yet implementation has been weak and perceived as ineffective, and artisanal mining remains dominant and largely informal (Nasarawa State Government, 2018; National Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Ogezi, 2005; Ezeaku, 2012). From a rentier standpoint, these patterns are coherent: external rents reduce the urgency of building a complex, locally grounded governance regime for solid minerals and contribute to the paradox of abundance and underdevelopment (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999).

The conclusion is that Nasarawa's status as a subnational rentier state - embedded in a federally centralised minerals regime - has significantly constrained its ability to harness solid minerals for development. Mineral wealth alone has not translated into broad-based progress because the structure of state revenues, and the incentives it creates for political elites, have favoured dependence on oil rents and underinvestment in solid minerals governance.

Recommendations

To shift Nasarawa State away from a subnational rentier pattern and towards more active and developmental solid minerals governance, the following recommendations emerge from the analysis:

Improve transparency and predictability of derivation payments.

Federal and state authorities should establish clear reporting and auditing mechanisms for solid minerals derivation, so Nasarawa can reliably know what it receives and plan around mineral revenue as a meaningful, not marginal, component of its fiscal base (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Premium Times, 2012).

Strengthen the implementation of the 2018 revenue law.

Nasarawa State should invest in administrative capacity and anti-corruption measures within the ministries and agencies responsible for implementing the Environmental Degradation Control and Revenue Collection Law, streamline collection procedures, and digitise records to reduce leakages and improve enforcement (Nasarawa State Government, 2018).

Formalise and support artisanal mining.

The state can develop programs to register artisanal and small-scale miners, provide technical and financial support, and link them to formal markets, thereby improving productivity, environmental outcomes, and revenue collection, while gradually integrating the sector into a broader development strategy (Ogezi, 2005; Ezeaku, 2012; Azobu, 2015).

Develop forward and backward linkages.

Nasarawa should encourage investments in industries that use local minerals such as cement, glass, tiles, and agricultural inputs through targeted infrastructure, public-private partnerships, and incentives, turning solid minerals from isolated extraction into a source of industrial and agricultural growth (Eyre & Agba, 2007; Gyang et al., 2010).

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