Geopolitical Risk and the Strategic Reconfiguration of Trade: Asset Specificity, India–Russia Commercial Relations, and U.S.–Russia Bargaining Constraints | IJLTEMAS
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Geopolitical Risk and the Strategic Reconfiguration of Trade: Asset Specificity, India–Russia Commercial Relations, and U.S.–Russia Bargaining Constraints

Authors

Dr Abhishek Sharma

Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration, Bareilly College, Bareilly, Affiliated to M.J.P. Rohilkhand University, Bareilly (India)

Article Information

DOI: 10.51583/IJLTEMAS.2026.151000086

Subject Category: Management

Volume/Issue: 15/10 | Page No: 1066-1079

Publication Timeline

Submitted: 2026-10-28

Accepted: 2026-11-02

Published: 2026-11-10

Abstract

Scholarship on weaponized interdependence explains why a state that sits astride a network chokepoint can coerce others, but it says less about when the resulting weapon actually binds. This paper argues that the binding condition is the asset specificity of the delivery channel: coercion works on flows carried by fixed, destination-specific infrastructure and slips on flows carried by fungible modes that can simply be re-addressed. The 2022 sanctions programme against Russia is an unusually clean test, because the same coercer, the same target and the same window applied to three fuels with different channel specificity. Using the Our World in Data energy panel for 2000–2024 and synthetic-control estimation with placebo permutation inference, we find a large and robust break in Russian natural-gas production (ATT −10.2 index points; RMSPE-ratio p = 0.047) and an even larger one in the gas net-export proxy (−54.7 points; p = 0.059), against no detectable break at all in crude oil (ATT +0.9 points; p = 0.175). Coal sits in between but its counterfactual fails the pre-treatment fit test (RMSPE 2.92) and we report it as uninterpretable rather than as a result. India’s oil consumption path is statistically indistinguishable from its synthetic counterfactual (ATT +0.71 points), which shows that the India–Russia reconfiguration was a substitution of supplier rather than a change in the level of Indian demand. One of our own proposed indices — buyer-market thickness — runs against the hypothesis and we report that failure and reinterpret it. The implication for U.S.–Russia strategic dialogue is deflationary: Western leverage was concentrated on the high-specificity margin, that margin has already been severed, and little of it can be re-offered at a negotiating table

Keywords

weaponized interdependence; economic statecraft; asset specificity; synthetic control; Russian energy exports; India–Russia relations; sanctions effectiveness

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References

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