Vote buying and electoral integrity among registered voters in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, Nigeria.

Vote buying remains one of the most persistent threats to democratic consolidation and electoral integrity in Nigeria, particularly in states characterized by socio-economic vulnerability and institutional fragility. This study examined vote buying and electoral integrity among registered voters in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, Nigeria, with the aim of analyzing the socio-economic determinants of vote buying among registered voters, evaluating the effectiveness of existing electoral safeguards in mitigating transactional voting, and proposing a policy framework for strengthening electoral integrity in the region. Specifically, the study addressed three research questions: the extent to which localized poverty influences voters' susceptibility to financial inducements; how institutional and security lapses facilitate the operational success of vote buying; and the behavioural shifts required to decouple economic necessity from electoral participation. A comparative cross-sectional survey research design was adopted to obtain empirical evidence from registered voters across selected local government areas in both states. Data were collected using a structured questionnaire administered through a multistage sampling procedure. Descriptive statistics comprising mean and standard deviation were employed to summarize respondents' perceptions, while the Chi-square (χ²) test of independence was used to examine significant associations between socio-economic conditions, institutional factors, voter behaviour, and electoral integrity at the 0.05 level of significance. The findings revealed significant inter-state similarities and variations in the dynamics of vote buying. In both Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, localized poverty, unemployment, and declining household income significantly increased voters' susceptibility to financial inducement. However, the prevalence of vote buying was comparatively higher in Akwa Ibom State, where greater financial resources available to political actors enabled more extensive distribution of cash and material incentives during election periods. Conversely, respondents in Cross River State reported relatively stronger influence of community networks, party loyalty, and interpersonal relationships in facilitating electoral inducements. The study further established that institutional weaknesses, including inconsistent enforcement of electoral laws, inadequate prosecution of electoral offenders, and lapses in election security, significantly undermined the effectiveness of existing electoral safeguards in both states despite the introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS). The study concludes that technological innovations alone cannot eliminate transactional politics without complementary socio-economic and institutional reforms. The study recommends the implementation of comprehensive poverty-reduction and social protection programmes targeted at economically vulnerable communities; the establishment of an independent Electoral Offences Commission with enhanced investigative and prosecutorial powers supported by technology-driven election surveillance systems; and sustained civic and voter education programmes involving electoral institutions, civil society organizations, educational institutions, religious bodies, and traditional leaders to strengthen democratic values, discourage transactional voting, and promote long-term electoral integrity in Nigeria.

Vote buying, electoral integrity, registered voters, poverty, BVAS, electoral safeguards, Cross River State, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria.

1. Akinola, A. (2021). Electoral integrity in Nigeria: The role of public perception. African Journal of Political Science, 16(1), 1-18. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

2. Biezen, I., & Nohlen, D. (2008). Electoral institutions and democratic consolidation: The role of political parties. European Journal of Political Research, 47(1), 1-28. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

3. Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

4. Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. Electoral Studies, 27(4), 621–632. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

5. Birch, S. (2011). Electoral malpractice. Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

6. Braimah, F. I., & Fajimbola, J. O. (2025). Vote buying as voter logistics? A critical discourse of 2024 off-cycle elections in Nigeria. African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies, 18(2), 469–489. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

7. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper & Row. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

8. Danjibo, N. D., & Oladeji, A. (2007). Vote buying in Nigerian elections: An assessment of the 2007 general elections. Journal of African Elections, 6(2). [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

9. European Union Election Observation Mission. (2023). Nigeria general elections 2023: Final report. European Union. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

10. Ezeabasili, I. E. (2025). Vote buying and the integrity of 2019 and 2023 general elections in Nigeria. European Journal of Science, Innovation and Technology. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

11. Finan, F., & Schechter, L. (2012). Vote-buying and reciprocity. Econometrica, 80(2), 863–881. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

12. Hoffmann, L. K., & Patel, R. N. (2022). Vote-selling behaviour and democratic dissatisfaction in Nigeria. Chatham House. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

13. Khemani, S. (2015). Political economy of vote buying: Evidence from a field experiment in India. Journal of Development Economics, 115, 66-79. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

14. Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (2007). Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

15. Lindberg, S. I. (2003). It's our time to "chop": Do elections in Africa feed neo-patrimonialism rather than counteract it? Democratization, 10(2), 121–140. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

16. López, R. A., & Ramirez, J. (2020). Economic factors and the acceptance of vote buying: Evidence from Latin America. Electoral Studies, 67, 102-112. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

17. Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

18. Ibeanu, O. (2007). Introduction to election management. Independent National Electoral Commission. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

19. Isola, W. A., Adebayo, A. A., & Ojo, J. S. (2021). Poverty, clientelism and vote buying in Nigeria's democratic process. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 15(2), 28–39. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

20. Nwoko, K., Briggs, A. C., & Offor, O. G. (2023). Vote buying and electoral credibility in the 2019 and 2023 general elections in Rivers State, Nigeria: A study of Emohua Local Government Area. International Journal of Development and Public Policy, 3(11). [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

21. Nwankwo, O. (2019). Clientelism and electoral outcomes in Nigeria: Evidence from Calabar. Nigerian Journal of Political Science, 10(2), 45-60. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

22. Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 19–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080106⁠DOI [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

23. Norris, P. (2014). Why electoral integrity matters. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge University Press [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

24. Norris, P., Elklit, J., & Reynolds, A. (2014). Methods and evidence. Advancing electoral integrity (pp. 34–50). Oxford University Press. OUP Academic [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

25. Norris, P., Frank, R. W., & Martínez i Coma, F. (Eds.). (2014). Advancing electoral integrity. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199368709.001.0001⁠.OUP Academic [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

26. OECD. (2022). Money in politics: Integrity and transparency in democratic processes. OECD Publishing. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

27. Osaghae, E. E., & Suberu, R. T. (2005). A history of identities, conflicts, and coexistence in Nigeria. CRISE Working Paper No. 6. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

28. Shehu, L. O., Araba, A. A., & Abdulrahman, I. (2025). Vote buying and the quest for sustainable democracy: The Nigerian context. Kashere Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3(2), 363–372. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

29. Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 315–325. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051683⁠ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

30. Uko, A. A., & Udom, E. (2020). Electoral violence and the integrity of elections in Nigeria: A case of Cross River State. International Journal of Political Science, 6(1), 89-100. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

31. Vicente, P. C., & Wantchekon, L. (2009). Clientelism and vote buying: Lessons from field experiments in African elections. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(2), 292–305. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

32. Van de Walle, N. (2007). Meet the new boss, same as the old boss? The evolution of the African state. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 71-85. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

33. Vande, P. T. (2020). Vote buying and credible elections in Nigeria: An opinion survey of voters on the 2019 general election in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]